

Empiricism

Primary and Secondary Qualities

§ 16. *Flame* is denominated *hot* and *light*; *snow*, *white* and *cold*; and *manna*, *white* and *sweet*, from the *Ideas* they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those *Ideas* are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that *the same fire*, that at one distance *produces* in us the sensation of *warmth*, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different sensation of *pain*, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say, that his *Idea* of *warmth*, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually *in the fire*; and his *Idea* of *pain*, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is *not* in the *fire*. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other *Idea* in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

§ 21. *Ideas* being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the *Idea* of cold by one hand and of heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those *Ideas* were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold.

Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II

The existence of material objects

They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist *without* the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not, which they tell us are sensations existing *in the mind alone*... But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is *acknowledged* to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else... A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs *against the existence of material substance*.

Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge* §10, 23