In Chapter Four of On Liberty – “Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual” – Mill acknowledges the connection between individuals and society, and attempts to draw a clear line between them.
What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? 4.1
The simple answer is that each should be restricted to what most properly concerns it. But this is too simple. Society is not and should not be concerned with your hobbies, your sexuality, your tastes in music and food. But what if you choose to collect guns instead of stamps? or if you write libellous novels? or perform violent, misogynistic music? Mill also asks a second, related question: how far can society exercise its authority over you? Does it have the right to put fluoride in the drinking water against your wishes? Can it eavesdrop on your telephone calls, or watch your comings and goings on CCTV? And what is your obligation to the state?
After his passionate hymn to autonomy in previous chapters, Mill here acknowledges that in a limited sense, the individual is dependent upon society. The benefits of living in a community come at a price, and that price is a code of conduct that individuals are obligated to observe:
This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. 4.3
The second obligation has been mentioned briefly before as ‘positive acts for the benefit of others’ (1.11), although here it is couched in more specific terms of protection and defence. Mill goes on to say that these conditions can be enforced ‘at all costs’ (a phrase that sounds odd in the mouth of a utilitarian). A share in the defence of society could mean conscription in time of war, or perhaps contribution to the costs of a police force through taxation. It is a small step to extend this notion to good governance generally (provision of schools and hospitals, maintenance of roads, disposal of sewage and rubbish). All these cost money, and society therefore has the right to expect all citizens to contribute – and to punish anyone who does not pay their taxes.
The first obligation Mill mentions is the practical application of the Harm Principle. Purely self-regarding behaviour is, of course, immune from state interference as it does not cause harm:
In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences. 4.3
But Mill now goes into a little more detail as he explores the boundary between individual and society. After his defence of the individual so far, he is concerned to dispel any sense that he is advocating ‘selfish indifference’: people are always affecting, and affected by, other people and therefore owe each other consideration. This should take the form of ‘disinterested benevolence’ (§4), but falls short of actual interference. People should use their powers of persuasion and exhortation to encourage and support others – all the apparatus of the free discussion of ideas that Mill has articulated before. But when consenting adults are involved in non-harmful activities, coercion is not permissible.
In certain cases (that is, when it leads to greater utility) Mill allows that antisocial behaviour, although not harmful, may be subject to public scrutiny and individuals may suffer from the poor opinion of others. Some types of behaviour lead naturally to admiration in others – and some to:
... inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others. 4.6
Such inconveniences include cautioning others against the agent, or withholding certain opportunities. For Mill, this constitutes a free expression of opinions, although it sounds uncomfortably like the beginnings of the tyranny of the majority.
The key to these cases is, as always, whether a person’s behaviour has crossed the boundary set down by the Harm Principle.
The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. 4.7
Only in the latter case can society exercise its right to punish. In the former, society can do little more than avoid, or preferably help, the offending individual. Mill argues that poor behaviour is a consequence of a failure of education. Once society has discharged its obligation to educate a citizen, and that citizen has earned the natural contempt of others, the right to interfere has come to an end.
... the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. 4.11
Behaviour which simply offends others, but does not cause harm, is not subject to state regulation. Mill gives a number of highly charged examples of such behaviour that should be immune from government interference and ‘moral police’ (§13): eating pork (which may offend Muslims); marriage among the clergy (which may offend Catholics); public amusements (which may offend puritans); private wealth (which may offend socialists); drinking alcohol (which may offend prohibitionists); working on Sundays (which may offend the religious); and polygamy among Mormons (which may offend Christians). Such behaviour, although exciting strong passion in its opponents, is not the business of society or government.
In the final chapter, Mill offers further real-life examples designed to test and clarify his two principles – that is, the Harm Principle and the Social Authority Principle (5.2). As an example of his approach, it is worth considering his analysis of activities like prostitution and gambling.
Mill poses a difficult question: given that self-regarding behaviour which causes harm only to the agent is permissible and protected by the Harm Principle, is it acceptable for another person to ‘counsel or instigate’ such action (§8)? If a woman is free to sell her body, is another person free to act as her pimp? There are arguments on both sides of this question. On the one hand, logical consistency requires that if an action is not prohibited by the state, then profiting from that action should also be allowed. On the other hand, society should protect the freedom of individuals to choose their own path, and that choice should not be affected by self-interested parties. A pimp’s contribution to discussion is hardly disinterested. There is a scent of moralism here: Mill is willing to consider interference where normally he would not: after all, in an important sense all trade involves parties acting out of self-interest and prostitution is a form of trade. To be fair, however, he acknowledges the difficulty:
The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. 5.8
Although outright prohibition of prostitution or gambling would contradict the Harm Principle, society is legitimately able to make life difficult for pimps and casino owners. One way is via the imposition of high taxes: not because society has the right to judge individual lifestyles (a so-called ‘sin tax’), but because taxation is inevitable and activities like gambling are luxuries rather than necessities. The same thinking justifies the imposition of licensing laws which restrict activities like drinking or gambling to certain places and within certain hours. These laws count as interference, but they are justified by the greater utility they bring: society is better off overall if such activities are so restricted. However, any further interference would be suited only to:
... a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. 5.10
Our own society is not in such a state, therefore further interference is unacceptable.
The analysis is complex and perhaps not entirely consistent, but it illustrates Mill’s flexibility and the subtle application of his principles. He is willing to admit that in such cases there is no easy solution. Ultimately, of course, the final decision must be based on utility – but calculating utility is rarely straightforward.